Tag Archives: accounting fraud

NOBLE Paper for Paper Plan 2

Those who take risks must be exposed to the losses that come from them. The restructure of Noble is an infringement of this principle.
The deal is an ASYMMETRY for the management.

  • If the company (that they bankrupted) ‘goes into liquidation’, they pocketed fees, going away with millions in salaries & bonuses.
  • If the company does not go in liquidation, the failed management and its failed VPs also end up winning a ~15% stake in the reformed entity, are absolved from criminal prosecutions perpetuating the siphoning with the next-to-become-losers…
  • If the company does not go in liquidation, the failed management and its failed VPs also end up winning a ~15% stake in the reformed entity, are absolved from criminal prosecutions perpetuating the siphoning with the next-to-become-losers…
  • Noble’s 6% Perpetual securities with a principal amount of $400m will be reduced to $25M (a 93,75% haircut) .
  • “Concurrent with the restructuring, the Existing Perpetual Capital Securities holders will be offered the opportunity to voluntarily exchange the Existing Perpetual Capital Securities into a new US$25 million 2.5% non-accumulative pay-if-you-can perpetual capital security instrument issued by New Noble (“New Perpetual Capital Securities”)
  • be offered the opportunity to voluntarily exchange the Existing Perpetual Capital Securities into a new US$25 million 2.5% non-accumulative pay-if-you-can perpetual capital security instrument issued by New Noble (“New Perpetual Capital Securities”).
  • (“New Perpetual Capital Securities”) Non-accumulative ? PIK, pay-if-you-can ?
  • Current shareholders will get a 10% of the ‘New Noble’ (90% dilution)


More importantly what is the standard of probity of Noble and its Financial Advisors PTJ Partners, Comprador, Moelis ?

As of Q1-2017, Noble Group (來寶集團) had $3,4B of marked-to-market fair-value gains on derivatives and commodity contracts.

As we theorized, Noble’s operating loss was created by the mismatch between the level of profits booked on these derivatives and commodity contracts and their underlying expected cash-flows, the real nature of this MtM could be viewed as an expensive liability that Noble (來寶集團) had to carry.

The backbone of Noble Group’s net equity represented future gains (P/L) on commodity contracts, comprising more than 102% of Noble Group’s equity, e.g what Noble Group was margining to get trade loans.

Did Noble even validated how they marked their curves, like against the brokers curves Ginga, Tradition, Sunguard ? Else how did they justified their MtM P/L ?

Noble said yes, but thecnically, no independant third-party has been able to verify the gains on the contracts.

In fact even PwC gave an assurance review, but hasn’t worked directly with the contract, Noble arguing the terms were “highly confidential” and disclosing would hurt its competitvity.

It’s on what Noble borrowed from the Banks HSBC, ING and Deutsche Bank.

Not only this FV on G/L was improperly valued, Noble had also to fund the “ to-arrive equity”.

Predictably it’s what they did.

First they did a ‘discounted’ $500m rights issue, which was said ‘necessary’ to deal with what Noble called a “liquidity crunch” after then creditors and banks reduced their lines.

Then came a $750m 8.750% bond issue sold to the public in March of this year to support the “Fair-value-to-arrive equity”.

Most of Noble (if not all) tangible assets and offtakes have also been sold below the reported BV … and Noble Group, despite all its backstops, has been forced to realize a loss of nearly $4.99B for 2017.

Now finally they had to restructure ?

They are switching entities, leaving current bagholders with claims on an empty shell.

Noble group floats that post restructuring “New Noble” could be listed on the SGX, a wrong, highly uncertain and legally-challenged assertion.

Noble believes the proposed financial restructuring also sets a firm foundation in creating options for future strategic alliances.

What kind of clients or investors will want to seal business deals or only be associated with these characters in the future ?

The Noble Files 贵族档案


Noble Americas Corp failed and it’s wonderful

Noble Americas Corp failed and it’s wonderful because we like to see awfully bad people fail.

For the records they were given a blank card and what they did with it was roulette “double the stakes or quit” losing million dollars in negative cash flows per day* depending on how you read  Noble’s torture of its operating income from supply chain and  non-cash mark-to-market unrealised observable positions or its (bogusphysical turnover.

STAMFORD — Commodities trader Noble Group, which has offices at 107 Elm St. in Stamford, Conn., plans to lay off 84 Stamford-based employees by Dec. 31, 2017.

The layoff notice was received last Friday by the state Department of Labor. Affected positions at Noble Americas Corp.’s downtown offices, at 107 Elm St., include accountants, analysts, managers, senior vice presidents and traders. The cuts are scheduled to be made by Dec. 31.

If you want to know the real story of Noble Group, it is pretty simple :  in trading A 3rd or a 2nd won’t make it. It’s not enough. Vitol doesn’t re-hire thirds-traders or failed VPs. (Got to get everything right and 10/10), or the market will grind you down to the ground, it will.

Noble Americas Corp failed and it’s wonderful.

Merry Christmas.

the Noble Files 高贵组文件 研究

Noble’s “Reverse Working-Capital”…

All traders share an aspiration to borrow OPM and most of them, one day, will trade with money they aren’t eligible. Noble fell very young in the powder pot.

At one point in the time, Noble Group certainly received liquidity that they didn’t qualify for–Now the same banks are scrambling to unwind Noble’s balance sheet.

From FT

“Noble said the lower than expected sale price for its gas and power assets reflected the conversion of working capital into cash and a revaluation of trading positions due to “market volatility”.

“Mercuria had paid $102m for the business and deposited a further $83m in an escrow account”. 

“That figure is much less than the $261m Noble estimated it would be paid for the business last month when it asked shareholders to approve the sale”.

  • The conversion of working capital to cash assets is the portion attributed to the Gas/power unit on Noble Group Q3’s consolidated Balance sheet, Statements of Cash-Flows and Income statement.


  •  $76,000,000 of Noble Gas & Power valuation was the working capital attributed to third parties or Banks (payables finance, inventory finance, receivables finance).


  • Mercuria has paid the agreed price on the BUs to the seller minus this reverse-supplied capital by third-parties e.g restating the sales and actual P&L of Noble Gas & Power.


Mercuria Noble Group value breakdown.png

 The unit was marked by Noble at $394M in 1H-2017.

  • The $185M paid by Mercuria for Noble Gas & Power also suggests that Noble self-estimated the BU at more than twice its net asset value.

“Under a deal agreed in the past couple of weeks, Mercuria has given Noble access to $400m of its unutilised credit lines in return for a fee and information about its trading positions in coal and iron ore, according to people with knowledge of the arrangement.”

To avoid confusion, Mercuria isn’t altruistically given access but is tentatively placing the deal externally for a 200-250bps fee, contingent to 80/20 banks money and two leveraged funds money-without any risk or fiduciary relationship to the related parties we muse.

These funds are not first-payee loss in the case of a total loss / get whacked.

(EFA and Inoks Capital) target 1000-1200bps net returns in Asia trade finance coveting borrowers who do not have a credit rating  / or that banks just don’t want as clients (the rotten fish).

Cost of capital is cheap, albeit distorted by low rates. 

Noble Group is the perfect designated candidate: has destroyed its credits and its WACC represents the best uncorrelated opportunity on a risk-adjusted basis.

(Except for two minor details).

  1. The counterparty in the transaction contemplated by the funds doesn’t trade for a profit.
  2. Doesn’t generate cash as the banks unwinding the counterparty’s balance sheet.

We think concerned investors would like to develop a discussion with their private wealth advisers.

Among other things EFA and INOKS disclose very little the break-down of their funds other than a monthly return or geographies. This is perhaps the only real “informational advantage” that the “trade finance funds” have.

The Noble Files 贵族档案

Banks Chasing the”tails” in Hong Kong -The Noble Group (來寶集團)

Noble Group (來寶集團) has no or few audited flow supporting their 48B$ sales of commodities.

According to the industry, their turnover, by any account, would appear as vastly overstated.

At an average of 10 days shipment and with cost of the goods sold of $48.58B FY16, the average inventory in transit recorded by Noble would have to be at least $1.256B. The the audited number was only $2.6M FY16.

FY2016 The average transit time of Noble was now 0,019 days, either implying that Noble has used scuds to ship the company  or that the corporation had a COGS inflated by 10 to 15 times in 2016.

Noble Group inventory in-transit

Noble Group Ltd. Financial Statements 31 December 2016

As of May 2017 the company had YTD losses (330) Millions in operating cash-flows but self-assessed itself with a net equity of $3.849B while of this net equity is tied to the fair value gains of its derivative and long-term commodity contracts.

Iceberg Research, the research firm has challenged Noble Group (來寶集團) over mark-to-market accounting of these contracts.

Bankers know that the last 24 months have been punctuated by a series of catastrophes, credit downgrades and bizarre resignations at Noble.

CEO ex-GS Alireza, Mr. Elman and Noble Group’s chief financial officer Robert van der Zalmin in particular who has stepped down from his position after taking a leave of absence for “health reasons”.

Traders (smart money) have also left at the right time. (Fabrizio,Steve Bader, Paolo B, Ted, Doug M..)

As of Q1-2017, Noble Group (來寶集團) had $3,4B of marked-to-market fair-value gains on derivatives and commodity contracts.

What does the $3.4B MtM figure represents ?-this MtM is not contracts that can be liquidated to cash.

noble group enron

Mark-to-market (M-t-M)

To mark-to-market is to calculate the value of a financial instrument (or portfolio of such instruments) at current market rates or prices of the underlying.


Example for illustrative purpose:

On 1 Jan 2017: Noble buys 2,000,000 MT for June 2019 delivery at $59/mt. It turns immediatly in the derivatives market and sells the equivalent of 2,000,000 MT of paper contracts. This is the Coal API2 Argus futures contracts.

This is the Coal API2 Argus Futures Contracts.



1 Jan 2017: Noble has a +MtM of 0 (Contract price is $59 and the Argus Futures is at $59)

1 Feb 2017: The Argus Coal API2 futures is at $64,25. The +MtM on the coal contract is +$10,5M

20 March 2017: The Argus API2 Futures dropped to $59,25/MT The +MtM on the coal contract is +$500K

1 May 2017: The Argus API2 settled at 62,55 and the +MtM on the coal contract is now +$7,1M

Noble Group MtM on Coal contract:

mtm coal noble group.png

The 2,000,000 MT of Coal produces a MtM gains between $500K and $11.5 millions.


Capezize Ship

In order to produce $3.4B of MtM gains one would have to buy not 2,000,000 MT of coal , as in this example, but nearly 958 million metric tons – the equivalent of 6937 Capezize cargoes Richards Bay-Qingdao, China or 5 voyages per week for the next 13 years… plus an equivalent position in the derivatives.

This represents a considerable tonnage even for the largest firms of the industry (Cargill, Rio Tinto, BHP, Vale, Anglo American) put all together.

According to BP statistical review of word energy 2016, the world coal production was 786.1 million tonnes (2015)…

An inevitable conclusion is that Noble uses a mountain of derivatives to maintain its MtM coal pile or … something else

Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the $3.4B MtM mark used by Noble Group(來寶集團)  translates to coal hedges at 479 USD/MT– The Argus APi2 CIF Rotterdam futures in the $60s/mt.

So…. Accounting fraud …. ?

Won’t  be the first time…

These days Noble is looking to refinance a $3.849B net equity. which has more the financial substance of a “Fair-value to-arrive equity” (sic)

This happens at a moment when Noble has just screwed up both its recent fixed income investors and shareholders.

The thing that frightens banks the most is not having a good risk management process in place because it opens the possibility of financial losses and frauds. A trader with no risk management is like playing roulette; double or quits.

Fraud is the worst nightmare for any bank specialized in commodity lending, but some will always chasing the“tails” in Hong Kong no matter what.

the Noble Files 高贵组文件 研究