This time Noble (來寶集團) will work for itself, not for the banks…

Last year we predicate that refinancing Noble (來寶集團) would be a lose-lose deal in which everyone would end up looking bad.

 

“At some points the Banks must get out, must unload the RCF risk with the red pill and it means that Noble will work for the Banks”.

“This is the equity offering of a company with very questionable or no prospects, transferring risks to retail investors”.

In short, this is a lose-lose deal in which everyone ends up looking bad”.

Refinancing Noble: a Lose-Lose Deal

March 16, 2016 

–  the Noble Files 高贵组文件 研究

The only thing we got wrong in 2016 is that some Banks would still accept to refinance the liabilities of Noble (來寶集團) on the back of an equity raising.

The investors have eaten the red poison pill and we simply overestimated their level of sophistication.

Can anybody look back and say it was good to let Noble raise more than 1.2B in equity offering and bonds ?

• The 750M bond raised is traded at 40c on the dollar.
• Equity investors who also subscribed to the 500M share rights issue at 0.20/share are now at 0.03…

Success can’t be imposed on this circus.

As of Q1-2017, Noble Group (來寶集團) had $3,4B of marked-to-market fair-value gains on derivatives and commodity contracts.

What does the $3.4B MtM figure represents ?-this MtM is not contracts that can be liquidated to cash.

Given that the Operating loss is created by a mismatch between the level of profits booked on these derivatives and commodity contracts and their underlying expected cash-flows, the real nature of this MtM can be viewed as an expensive liability that Noble (來寶集團) has to roll-out.

Noble (來寶集團) has even pushed back against guidelines in Singapore for disclosing information on its executives’ remuneration.

Perhaps Noble (來寶集團) needs to raise another 2B to pay coming debt retirement (reassure the lenders that they refinance the fair to arrive net equity on a future solvency basis) – as the book doesn’t generate positive cash-flow since 44 months.

It is no longer a working capital shortfall that we observe but the liquidation of a trader  (virtually silent in the physical market)…

Lenders will choose to roll up credit. IF not, they precipitate a restucturing which is told to be not in the interest of the 2020 and 2018 bond holders (FT).

 

It should be pretty clear.

This time Noble (來寶集團) will work for itself, not for the banks.

On the road show, Noble has asked the permission to decrease its net equity.

It wants to set its own “term sheet” and its covenants to be relaxed, exactly the opposite wanted by the other side.

4 Banks are long with a $1.5B exposure left with this intermediate situation :

• no financial substance.
• no unencumbered assets.
• no physical trading traceability.
• A porous  risk management and a total absence of management oversight.

 

 

the Noble Files 高贵组文件 研究

Noble’s only escape is to borrow more debt to cover its debt service and booked net equity.

Like Wilmar, Noble had not 2 but 3 years to renovate itself and they failed.

• Noble Group (來寶集團)  has generated negative cash-flows from the operations to the tune of
  -$1600M in 2014
  -$600M in 2015
  -$900M in 2016,
  -330M for Q-1 2017
  Noble has no intrinsic value by DCF. The book is not performing.

The market is not over-reacting.

The question is now rather about how Noble can still suggest that they are a $3.9B equity company (” their fair-to-arrive net equity”). 

Simply because Noble knows it cannot devalue its substantial booked value.

• 

•  Bye Elman, the chairman and co-founder has officially resigned.

• The business has no audited flow supporting their 48B$ sales of commodities.
• Their volume by any account seems vastly overstated.

Noble has screwed up itself, its fixed income investors and its shareholders.

• Only two months ago investors were lured by a 8.75% coupon  750 million unsecured bond. The maneuver was purposely to win time and bridge financials until Noble could conclude a potential deal with an acquirer (Sinopec).
• No immediate performance catalysts suggest that this transaction is even remotely possible.

• This unsecured bond issued at a 8.75% is now trading at 50. We no longer talk of yield to maturity but recovery rates.
• This bond has to be refinanced next April.
• By what ?
• You need to factor if Noble can issue another 750M bond this time at 18-20% coupon and assume that the same investors bited by the snake will want to lose 100 to 50.
• Equity investors who also subscribed to the 500M share rights issue at 0.20/share are now at 0.05.
• Can some undisclosed aspects of Noble performance could have made the company less attractive to these investors ?

-The trader has lost $5.5M of Operating cash-flows at the end of each business day Monday-Fri during Q1.

How a serious bank will support the financing on no acceptable performance ?

Noble Group (來寶集團) is now two things; coal and oil liquids.

Credit lines have been granted on the performance of the oil liquids, the so-called “ebit indestructibility” of the Noble oil liquids segment but for Q1-17 the operating income from Supply Chains of $27M doesn’t even cover the interest rate load on this segment.

As alluded earlier, Noble Group is again in the sights of the credit agencies.

S&P questions the financial guearing of Noble. 

Noble’s only escape is to use a 2nd credit card to cover its $220M annualized interest bills and refinance its “fair-to-arrive” net equity. 

We are heading towards a restructuring event.